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A Matter of Rhetoric:
The Diversity Rationale in Political Context
Daniel Ibsen Morales*

INTRODUCTION

The scholarly discourse regarding affirmative action in
higher education has gone awry, becoming shrillr and calcified.2
The discussion has come to focus excessively on the formal and
the philosophical aspects of the program (What doctrine properly
justifies it? Is the program moral?3 Does it go far enough?4),
while neglecting to consider, in a serious and methodical way,
how the realpolitik of American race relations might be brought
to bear on these more "academic" considerations. Instead of analyzing affirmative action in the shadow of platonic notions of justice, propriety, or fairness, legal academics should consider what
race-based remedies are feasible in light of current political leanings, or whether affirmative action in higher education is effectively creating a more integrated workforce. A full consideration
of the way in which legal reasoning intersects with the political
dispute surrounding affirmative action would lead scholars towards these more productive paths of inquiry.
The problem of affirmative action scholarship written in a
political vacuum has become all the more acute in the wake of
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, J.D. Yale Law School, B.A. Williams College. The
views expressed herein are solely my own and do not represent the opinions of Kirkland &
Ellis LLP or its clients. I wish to thank Jacob Corre for his generous feedback; my parents, Ibsen Morales and Haydee Iglesias, for their unflagging support; and, finally, my
wife, Gwendolyn Baxter Morales, without whose love and encouragement I could not have
finished this article.
1 See Lino A. Graglia, Fraud by the Supreme Court: Racial Discrimination by a
State Institution of Higher Education Upheld on "Diversity" Grounds, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
57, 81 (2004); see also BrianT. Fitzpatrick, The Diversity Lie, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
385, 397 (2003).
2 See generally James Boyd White, What's Wrong With Our Talk About Race? On
History, Particularity, and Affirmative Action, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1927 (2002) (locating the
problem of racial discourse in a failure to come to terms with history).
3 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 685 (2004).
4 See Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You
Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1224 (1991).
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former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,5 the landmark decision that upheld the use of
race-conscious admission policies at the University of Michigan
Law School. That decision relied on the so-called "diversity rationale" for affirmative action, which holds that race-conscious
admissions programs are constitutionally permissible where an
educational institution seeks to racially diversify its student body
for the purpose of ensuring that a variety of viewpoints are represented in campus discourse.6 Notably, this rationale excludes
the possibility that a university might implement affirmative action programs in order to carry out a vision of social justice that
seeks to compensate victims of past or current discrimination.
While the diversity rationale occupies a prominent place in
extra-legal discourse,? its use as a basis for authorizing affirmative action is heavily disfavored in academic circles. Emblematically, one prominent conservative scholar entitled his terse, antiGrutter screed, Fraud by the Supreme Court.B In keeping with
the hyperbole of the title, the article set out to claim that Grutter
was, in essence, the first sign of the legal apocalypse; its total
disregard for the rule of law would, in the author's opinion, cause
the "entire legal system ... to denigrate into a farce."9 The article located Grutter's fraudulence and deviance from traditional
norms of jurisprudence in its unwillingness to adhere to minimal
standards of honesty.1o "Honesty," in the author's view, would
have meant dubbing affirmative action reverse discrimination
carried out in the name of a faddish social movement.
In itself, the depth of this reaction on the part of conservatives should not be particularly surprising; they have waged an
assault against affirmative action for at least the past decade.u
But the extent to which the conservative opinion on these subjects is widely shared by other academics is quite surprising. Mter all, few scholars of any political persuasion would stand by
the Fraud author's side as he advocates altering the Fourteenth
Amendment in an effort to reign in judicial "activists."12 Never539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
Id. at 328-30.
It has become nearly mandatory for major institutions to have committees on race
and gender which are nearly always referred to as committees on diversity. See, e.g.,
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Diversity, http://www.kirkland.com/OurFirm/diversity.aspx (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006); Coca-Cola Company, Diversity, http://www2.coca-cola.com/
ourcompany/ourdiversity.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
8 Graglia, supra note 1, at 57.
9 Id. at 81.
10 Id.
11 See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAJ". L. REV. 953 nn.1--3 (1996).
12 Lino Graglia, Altering 14th Amendment Would Curb Court's Activist Tendencies,
5
6
7
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theless, prominent liberal scholars like Jed Rubenfeld, Sanford
Levinson, Kim Forde-Mazrui, and Jack Balkin agree that the diversity rationale is a rhetorical sham used to justify a program
whose proper constitutional authority rests on other theories.I3
Indeed, the scholarly distaste for diversity is so strong that I
would hazard that the vast majority of American law professors
believe it to be an illegitimate constitutional basis for affirmative
action.I4
This paper locates the source of this surprising consensus in
the failure of scholars of all political persuasions to consider how
the discourse of American racial politics restricts the institutional capacity of the Court. This charged atmosphere limits the
scope and species of remedies that the Court can authorize, and,
equally important, what rhetorical form such authorization can
take. The power of racial minorities is so limited that to successfully protect these groups, the Court-the only political institution insulated from politics-must use its expressive power to
steer the public discourse in ways that work to affirm the tenuous political footholds that racial minorities have managed to
gain. As this article will show, the affirmative action rationales
favored by the academy would catalyze political conflict and
likely lead to affirmative action's repeal, whereas the diversity
rationale works to minimize such discord.
This article will prove this thesis by presenting a theory of
American racial politics that closely reflects the reality of limited
minority political power, illustrating how other rationales for affirmative action conflict fatally with that political reality, and, finally, reading Grutter in a way that highlights how the decision
successfully navigates this difficult political terrain. By reading
Grutter in this way, I will ultimately show that the diversity rationale is the most effective means of securing the interests of racial minorities in the face of limited political and economic clout,
as well as continuing racial prejudice. By taking this particularized tack, however, this paper aims to push scholars to expand
the definition of legal reasoning to include decisions, like Grutter,
that require a rhetoric that is more political than classically legal.

AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, July 10, 2005, at Hl.
!3 See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427-28 (1997);
SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 55, 46 (2003) (quoting e-mail from Jack
Balkin to Sanford Levinson stating that diversity is a code word for claims to past mistreatment); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 3, at 750 n.224.
14 See Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67
CAL. L. REV. 87, 122 (1979) (stating that the author has never met a professional academic who believes that diversity for education's sake motivates preferential admission).
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MAJORITARIAN PROBLEMATICS: HOW TO SAFEGUARD
MINORITY RIGHTS WITHIN A DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

This section begins with a practical question: How can the
Supreme Court secure minority rights in a culture that conceives
of democracy in a majoritarian way? In our democratic system
the legal or philosophical justification for protecting minority
rights of any kind-criminal, political, religious or racial-will
always reveal the central anxiety of representational government: Where is the proper boundary of the popular will?I5
Thoughtful consideration of minority rights in a democratic system, of course, has a long history; the American founders, for
their part, were terrified of democracy's tyrannical potential.I6
Still, in the popular imagination, democracy means populism:
one person, one vote, never mind the rest. Americans are terribly
skeptical of those institutions that would thwart their will. It is
not accidental that our constitutional tradition has moved
teleologically toward more direct democracy; ours is a nation
suspicious of the "knowing" elite.
This ardent populism will always remain in tension with a
Constitution presided over by an unelected court. Elites, those
usually seeking to restrain the popular will, have sought to justify the anti-populist role of the Supreme Court by offering baroque theories of judicial review, theories that give learned expression to what is a uniquely democratic anxiety. Alexander
Bickel, in his famous treatise on our constitutional government,
The Least Dangerous Branch,11 dubbed this particular tension
the "countermajoritarian difficulty."
In that book, Professor Bickel did manage to find a place for
the Supreme Court in American democracy, but he left the "difficulty" essentially unresolved, and it continues to be a generative
tension in constitutional theory. Still seeking resolution, other
celebrated scholars, especially John Hart Ely,1s have built on
Professor Bickel's work to the point where a canon of theory now
defends the Supreme Court's power to protect minority rights.
As with Bickel, though, Ely's tortured "political process theory" of
15 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16--19 (1962).
16 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison); see also Julian
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1523-24 (1990).
17 Bickel, supra note 15, at 16.
18 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
136 (1980) (presenting a "process" theory of judicial review allowing for the Supreme
Court to intervene where democracy is dysfunctional).
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judicial review does not resolve the "difficulty'' at all. Indeed,
both Ely's and Bickel's work might be best thought of as symptoms of the countermajoritarian difficulty, rather than cures.
Nevertheless, this article presumes that the Supreme Court
should play a significant role in defending-and even advancing-minority political gains,19 a role that is especially salient
where "discrete and insular minorities" are concerned.2o
We should at this point inject a shot of legal realism into
what has been a strictly abstract analysis. The countermajoritarian difficulty tangibly concerns the Justices of the Supreme
Court in few cases, as the vast majority of the Court's docket mobilizes the interest of a very narrow constituency. As a result of
this generally limited interest, the Court does not directly confront its countermajoritarian role except in very exceptional
cases; the proximity of the "difficulty'' to the consciousness of the
Court is a function of the intensity of the democratic gaze, if you
will. The more lay interest in the case at bar, the more cognizant
the justices are of their countermajoritarian role.
In those rare instances of intense public scrutiny, the Court
is forced to confront its paradoxical institutional role head-on. As
the only institution that can adequately safeguard minority
rights or political gains, it has an implicit duty to do so because,
unlike elected representatives, the Justices will continue to sit in
their capacity on the Court even in the face of majority discontent. Even so, this very advantage means that its institutional
capacity is extremely limited in a representative democracy because its authority is ever-questionable. The only way that it can
fend off criticism and maintain its institutional credibility is to
use its rhetorical or expressive power to persuade the masses. To
persuade effectively, however, the Court must craft its opinions
with a public audience in mind. Such a task necessarily requires
a keen understanding of how the Court's arguments will play out
in the public sphere.
This method of persuasion is essential because for all that
constitutional theorists like Bickel and Ely have accomplished in
constructing a philosophical backbone to support the countermajoritarian role of the court, these theories will only persuade the
academically inclined. And even among the thoughtful, the pull
of a simple majoritarian view of democracy is quite strong. As a
result, the countermajoritarian difficulty is not something that
19 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
that "discrete and insular minorities" might require more judicial protection).
20 See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529,
538 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997)).
.

192

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:187

can be transcended through theory; it will always be a concrete
locus of dispute.
Accordingly, the strict-constructionist approach to judicial
review preys on the populist weaknesses of academic theories
like Ely's.21 Most destructively for liberals who wish for the court
to aggressively police majority excesses, the position of the strict
constructionists is much more readily intelligible to a lay audience, in part because the theory's principal author, Antonin
Scalia, explicitly shares the majoritarian ethos.22
By fixing the Constitution's meaning in a particular historical moment, strict constructionists avoid, as much as possible,
the process of adapting constitutional meaning to contemporary
life. Indeed, strict constructionism does an end-run around the
countermajoritarian difficulty by constructing the myth that answers to constitutional questions are foreordained. Under strict
constructionism there is no "difficulty" because the Supreme
Court is not exercising any real power. The Court's hands are
tied; it is merely doing the will of the law.23
The elegance of strict-constructionist jurisprudential philosophy, especially when compared to the complexity of liberal
theories, is a significant tactical advantage outside the academy.
In its distilled form, this conservative approach ends up looking
like common sense: implement the law as written because words
mean what they say. There is no similarly succinct way to advocate that the Court should intervene where politics deals too
harshly with a disfavored group. Liberal theories, like Ely's, lose
nearly all of their persuasive value when reduced to a sound bite,
the dominant structure of public political discourse. Strict constructionism, on the other hand, is even more powerful in that
truncated form.
Indeed, Bickel's succinct neologism for the problem of judicial review is itself symptomatic of the larger problem that liberal theories of jurisprudence have in insinuating themselves
into the public sphere: try having a cocktail party conversation
with non-lawyers about the "countermajoritarian difficulty."
In the same way, liberals have a very difficult time conveying to the culture at large the need for substantive, rather than
merely formal, remedies for racism. The colorblind principles es21 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 853-55
(1989) (using the contrast between the complexity of the liberal approach and the simplic-

ity of originalism to dismiss the possibility that liberals like Ronald Dworkin could create
a workable constitutional theory).
22 See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 530, 533.
23 See Scalia, supra note 21, at 854; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184 (1989).
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paused by conservatives, of course, perfectly reflect the intuitions
and the policy preferences of the American majority. The common-man appeal of conservative rhetoric is typified by the conservative refrain that affirmative action constitutes "reverse discrimination." Framing affirmative action in those terms is
designed to tap in to the commonplace notion that "two wrongs
do not make a right." Never mind that the "wrongs" are rather
different in scope.
Such frames are powerful because affirmative action is not
just another countermajoritarian program. Mfirmative action
and other programs that implicate race are doubly vexing. Not
only do they produce the general anti-populist anxiety just discussed, i.e., the countermajoritarian dilemma, they also throw
the American narrative-unceasing economic and social progress, radical equality of opportunity-into crisis by bringing to
the forefront the race-based inequality that is generally repressed to sustain that myth.
The visceral quality of visual stimulus makes race24 a particularly effective way to reveal the American narrative's mythological character, and, as a result, create a nationwide bout of
cognitive dissonance.25 How can the United States be a country
of equals when one can see with her own eyes that people of color
are so disproportionately poor, uneducated, and jailed?
The potency of race as the primary signifier of American inequality has been amplified by the proliferation of media that
bring depictions of disparity to leafy, isolated suburbs where all
is (seemingly) well. There is nothing contemporary about this
phenomenon; television also played a crucial role in Martin Luther King, Jr.'s civil rights strategy. Indeed, one way to conceptualize what happened during the civil rights movement is to say
that the visualization of black oppression through new technology created fissures in the American narrative that were so large
that they had to be closed. In today's media-saturated environment, where newspaper readership remains in free-fall, Americans engage with their world in a way that is increasingly visual,
rendering race an even more potent signifier than it was in the

24 Though race is considered largely a social construct, there are, nevertheless, visual cues that allow race to be a functional basis for racism and racial classification, even if
these break down upon close inspection.
25 Psychology's cognitive dissonance theory, which holds that individuals have a
need for consistency in their thoughts and beliefs, supports this idea. See LEON
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (Stanford Univ. Press 1962) (1957);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 336 n.77 (1987) (attributing the "development of attitudes concerning race" at least partially to "the search for coherence").

194

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:187

1960s.26
The reader should have little trouble conjuring the latest
public visualization of American racial disparity; it occurred
when Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, Louisiana. When the
citizens of New Orleans, the vast majority of them poor and
black, were left behind after the storm, the national discourse
undertook a discussion of why these people, so visibly distinct
from the American majority, were left to fend for themselves.
The social construction of America as a land of equals can only
exist if each individual blinds herself to the color of the inequality she sees before her; the public consumption of images from an
event like Hurricane Katrina makes such willful blindness more
difficult to sustain, because it conflicts so blatantly with the predominant myth of American equality.
These are among the more benign reasons that the adjudication of racial issues is overdetermined. The resolution of racial
issues is also fraught because negative racial attitudes, conscious
and unconscious, persist in American society. These attitudes allow people to construct counter-narratives that account for the
inequality exposed in situations like Hurricane Katrina by blaming the victims for mishandling their own lives.27 Thus, the fact
that those left behind in New Orleans were predominantly black
comes to signify the inferiority of people of color, not a collective
problem for which all Americans must take responsibility. From
this racist viewpoint, the existence of affirmative action is intolerable: why are they, those people society marks as "less than,"
entitled to special dispensation?
Public discussions about race are charged, then, because
they are highly disruptive to the public's workaday notions of our
society, especially racist ones. The abstract colorblindness that
Americans are socially required to cultivate runs up against what
citizens see with their own eyes. The Court's role in such cases
should be to steer the public discourse in a way that alleviates
this dissonance by mending the national narrative of equality.
Needless to say, for a court to alleviate such dissonance in a way
that serves the interest of racial minorities is a delicate process.
In the specific case of affirmative action in higher education,
26 See KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN
THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 69 (1993) (commenting that "television's
pervasive reach" is in large part responsible for society's ingrained images of crime that
"prominently featur[e] the faces of young black men").
27 See, for example, Bill O'Reilly's comments regarding Hurricane Katrina: "Many,
many, many'' hurricane victims who failed to evacuate New Orleans are "drugaddicted .... thugs." The Radio Factor, (Westwood One radio broadcast Sept. 13, 2005),
available at http:/lmediamatters.org/items/200509150001 (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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the narrative stakes are higher still for the Court because of the
unique role that universities now play in the American mythos.
Today's university is both the architect and the signifier of the
American meritocracy.2s The public has come to view universities as the gatekeepers to the American dream, and as social levelers that promise a nation free of permanent, old-world, class
stratification. A Supreme Court decision that even implicitly
questions the objectivity or the desirability of this imagined society of merit would provoke extreme reactions; so embedded is
meritocracy in the American sense of self that an attack on it is
an attack on the country's sense of being. Coupling a suggestion
of merit's subjectivity, as some scholars have, with an effort to
justify racial preferences will be still more inflammatory.29
All this is to say that the task of justifying affirmative action
in higher education is among the most difficult that a Supreme
Court can face, not because the program is unworthy or constitutionally unconscionable, but because its adjudication causes a
painful bout of national self-reflection. The vulnerable state of
the national psyche in these periods of public discourse requires
the Court to issue a decision aimed at the public3o that will mend
and restore the national narrative. The diversity rationale is
perfectly designed to diffuse this public tension and steer public
discourse in a way that leaves America's mythical self-image intact, while giving minorities the tiniest amount of race-based
wealth transfer.
Thus, the role of the Supreme Court in these cases is not to
explicate the "truth" of affirmative action, as the professoriate
would prefer, but to preserve the program through the judicious
and politic use of language designed to influence public perceptions. Such delicacy is particularly exigent because affirmative
action is constitutionally permissible, but not constitutionally
mandated. Because the Court cannot, in this case, legislate the
policy as a constitutional requirement, it must use its expressive
28 See James Traub, Ivory Tower Intrigues: The Pseudo-Meritocracy of the Ivy
League, SLATE, Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2128377/ (reviewing JEROME
KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT
HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 549 (2005) ("The selection process at elite universities is
widely understood as the outward symbol, and in many ways the foundation, of our society's distribution of opportunities and rewards.")). Jerome Karabel's book argues that
America's top universities "legitimateD the established order as one that rewards ability
and hard work over the prerogatives of birth." Id.
29 It is somewhat surprising that preferences for legacies do not inspire the same degree of animus as preferences based on race. Legacy preferences in particular undermine
the cherished American myth of the self-made man. Plainly, class-based animus is less
prevalent than racial animus in the United States, or perhaps legacy is a factor in admissions at so few public colleges that the animus against it is not very widespread.
30 It is journalists who translate court decisions into a format that the layperson can
parse.
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power to shape the public discourse in~ way that allows legislative permission to stand. In this way, the Court may comply with
its role to protect discrete and insular minorities. If the legal
problem is so constructed, the diversity rationale can be seen for
what it is: an effort to engage the political sphere in order to protect minority political gains.

II.

JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS RHETORICAL PERFORMANCES

Judicial opinions are rhetorical performances. The critic who
essays an assessment of any performance, whether dramatic or judicial, must he aware, among other things, of the particular role assigned to the actor, the likely audience for the performance, and the
effects sought by the performer.31

As a result of limited minority power, as well as the entrenched interests of the majority, the judicial opinion authorizing affirmative action must be a rhetorical performance par excellence. The Court must deploy its rhetoric in a way that shapes
the public discourse, and thereby stabilizes (as much as possible)
the political conflict surrounding the program in a way that benefits minorities. Yet, even as the diversity rationale furthers this
objective, critics have assailed the rationale, calling it destructive, pretextual, or dishonest. In part, these critiques result from
the failure of academics to follow Professor Levinson's advice;32
the professoriate seldom takes full account of the context in
which the Supreme Court authors an opinion. Instead, academics nearly always evaluate the Court's pronouncements as if they,
academics themselves, were the Justices' primary audience. Indeed, most constitutional scholarship operates under the fiction
that the persuasive values of the academy should actually dictate
the Court's jurisprudence.33
Cass Sunstein's scholarship is a notable exception to this
critical solipsism. His book, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, argues that there is a fundamental distinction between legal
reasoning, i.e., what judges must do, and the enlightenmentinspired, exegetical impulse that animates the scholarly mission.
31 Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAw's STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 187 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
32 In this author's view, Levinson fails to follow his own advice when he critiques the
diversity rationale without considering who the audience for Supreme Court affirmative
action decisions actually is. See LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 55-61.
33 See,
e.g., AKHIL REED AMAH, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (arguing in part that the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is incoherent and has become unmoored from the historical understanding of what
the Fourth Amendment was designed to do, i.e., to protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures). While erudite and persuasive, the book does not account for the
possibility that what the author sees as logical faults in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, like Miranda warnings, may have practical salutary effects in the real world.
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Professor Sunstein argues that where courts are faced with conflicts that may be resolved on a number of levels, i.e., the philosophical, the moral, the religious or the narrowly legal, they
should always choose the lowest possible level of resolution and
seek to reach an accord on that basis. This kind of reasoning is,
of course, a staple of common-law jurisprudence, but by adding a
good dose of political theory to those traditions, Sunstein manages to re-christen this method the use of "incompletely theorized
agreements."34
A prime example of the damage that courts may do when
they fail to use incompletely theorized agreements, and seek instead to resolve disputes in the manner of academics, occurred
twenty years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick,ss the consensual sodomy case recently overturned in Lawrence v. Texas.36
In Bowers, two men were arrested for engaging in consensual sex under a Georgia anti-sodomy statute that generally
went unenforced. In the majority decision, the Court upheld
Georgia's right to prohibit consensual sodomy based on the long
history of its proscription in America and throughout the world.
The Court put forth this rationale at a time when the gay rights
movement was suffering a huge setback. The spread of AIDS in
the early 1980s was widely blamed on homosexuals, a belief that
only served to further stigmatize the group.37
Sunstein's view is that Bowers should have been decided in
the plaintiffs favor, but on the exceedingly narrow grounds that
the state of Georgia should not be allowed to suddenly enforce a
long-dormant law.ss In this way, the Court would have stayed
out of the political debate entirely by promulgating a highly formalistic judgment. Instead of taking that minimalist tack, however, the Court not only ruled against the plaintiffs, it engaged in
a gratuitously callous analysis that only served to stir the pot of
political conflict by emphasizing the long-standing religious and
historical prohibition of same-sex sodomy.s9 By engaging in this
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-38 (1996).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
36 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that states may not criminalize consensual sex between adults of the same sex).
37 Cecilia Chung, Welcome to San Francisco Pride Week!, ASIANWEEK.COM, June 22,
2001, http://www .asianweek.com/200 1_06_22/opinion 1_voices_prideweek. html (noting
that the gay and lesbian rights movement began in the 1960s, but suffered a huge setback
in the 1980s when AIDS was largely blamed on homosexuals).
38 SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 156 ("Realistically speaking, the ban on consensual
homosexual sodomy is a weapon by which police officers and others harass people on invidious grounds. The existence of unenforced and unenforceable sodomy laws, used for
purposes of harassment, is objectionable under the due process clause for that reason.").
39 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-194 (stating that proscriptions against homosexual sodomy "have ancient roots").
34
35
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high-level historical and religious discussion, the Court did damage to the gay rights movement by authorizing the states' prohibition of the plaintiffs conduct on grounds "higher" than the law.
Reifying such historical and religious theories in the form of a judicial opinion stoked religious conservatives, who had already
constructed their anti-homosexual animus on a religious foundation. Moreover, by taking such a strong position on an emerging
socio-political issue, and then grounding that position in a historical rationale that fell outside of its institutional expertise, the
Court also ran the risk that the tide would turn against the decision, and that its understanding of history might have been
flawed, as, indeed, Lawrence later found.
Beyond illustrating the dangers of over-zealous judging,
Bowers also highlights the difficulty judges have in predicting future social changes. Presumably, few of the Justices in the Bowers majority could have imagined the extent to which gay Americans would become accepted in American society, much less that
in some states homosexuals would win the right to marry.
For all its grandstanding, however, Bowers did not change
the terms of the gay rights debate; it only affirmed the viewpoint
on one side of the divide. Such an outcome is typical of judicial
incursions into a broader discourse;4o even on those few occasions
where Supreme Court opinions do address a wider audience, the
Court seldom manages to define the terms of the public debate.
This lack of discursive command should not surprise, though. In
light of the common-law understanding of a judge's role, as well
as the judiciary's mandated isolation from politics, judges generally have a difficult time figuring out how their judgments will
interact in the world outside the nation's courthouses. Sunstein
believes that this disadvantage supports his theory of minimalist
jurisprudence by proving that the task of evaluating the reception of an audience outside the judiciary is beyond the judicial
ken.4I In his view, the political discourse should be left, as much
as possible, to politics.42
In its most extreme form, then, Sunstein's minimalist theory
of jurisprudence allows no room for the Court to make any jurisgenerative pronouncements, or to take on the role the Court
properly played in Grutter. Indeed, Sunstein believes that the
Court in both Bowers and Lawrence exceeded its institutional ca40 Even Justice Scalia acknowledges the public eye watching over the Court in certain cases. See Scalia, supra note 23, at 1178 (emphasizing the importance of drawing
distinctions in cases that seem similar but end in different results in order to satisfy a
"sense of justice" in the community).
41 SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 177.
42 /d. at 7.
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pacity.43 In his view, the Court should have invalidated the
Texas anti-sodomy statute in Lawrence without overruling Bowers.44 In this way, the Supreme Court would only reflect substantial changes in social norms, without seeking to further modify
those norms, or further catalyze the movement that led to the
initial shift.
Sunstein's view of Lawrence, however, is overly cautious and
damaging to those groups that encounter significant societal discrimination or a denial of full individual rights. There is a middle-ground between the social-obliviousness exemplified by Roe v.
Wade45 (where the Court's impatience led to a thirty year conservative backlash) and the extraordinarily timid casuistry that
Sunstein advocates.
In this author's view, Lawrence occupies that terrain. By following the fundamental shift in social attitudes, Lawrence manages to avoid a devastating political backlash.46 Yet, the decision
still pushes social mores forward by using official language to
grant dignity to homosexual acts.47 The Lawrence majority could
only have accomplished this task by disavowing the callous
rhetoric in Bowers, and replacing it with a narrative affirming
homosexuals' shared humanity. Further, by formulating deliberately opaque rhetoric that may be used by other courts to expand
the rights granted in Lawrence, the Court gave state courts a
powerful tool to further amplify the scope of gay rights. True,
this move has led to controversy. In the wake of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision granting gay marriage, in part
based on Lawrence, many states passed constitutional amendments banning the practice.48 While passage of those amendments is unfortunate, at least states are having meaningful political discourse about the subject of gay rights. Progress cannot
occur without controversy.
43 See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, De.~uetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27 (2003) (arguing that Bowers and Lawrence
should have been decided on grounds of desuetude or equal protection, rather than substantive due process).
44 ld. at 32.
45 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
46 Lawrence has created a backlash, but it is nothing compared to what happened in
Roe. The very fact that those who object to gay marriage have succeeded in passing
amendments limiting the definition of marriage illustrates the difference; Roe foreclosed
political debate and change, whereas Lawrence catalyzed it.
47 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
48 Thomas Roberts & Sean Gibbons, Same-Sex Marriage Bans Winning on State Bal3, 2004, http:!/www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/
lots, CNN.COM, Nov.
ballot.samesex.marriage/. However, the states that passed the amendments were so conservative that it is unlikely their state courts would have required gay marriage in the
first place. These amendments merely formalize what was de facto true prior to their
passage. ld.
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Indeed, something real must appear to be at stake for
Americans to engage in serious, difficult political conversation. If
the Court were to apply Sunstein's judicial minimalism, those
conversations would remain repressed because a minority group,
like homosexuals or Mrican-Americans, cannot easily force the
hand of a majoritarian legislature. It is appropriate that the
specter of Roe haunts Sunstein's minimalist theory, but Lawrence is not another Roe. Roe was damaging because it was so totalizing that it left no room for public discourse. Lawrence on the
other hand leaves significant room for debate, while giving the
polity the incentive to have the debate in the first place. Lawrence represents, in my view, a cautious, or, if you will, conservative progressivism that moves social mores forward without annihilating the ties that bind Americans together.
Lawrence also does not signify the limits of the Court's productive discursive political power, because, like Bowers, Lawrence did not change the terms of the public debate. Lawrence
may have shaped and catalyzed gay rights discourse, but the polity still talks about gay rights using the same essential language.
Lawrence became an occasion to discuss homosexuality generally-for politicians and advocacy groups on the right to decry
the so-called "gay agenda," and for those on the left to show their
solidarity with the gay-rights cause.49 The case did not fundamentally alter this dynamic.
On occasion, though, the Court can reframe an issue in a
way that actually reformulates American political discourse.
Justice Powell's concurring (de facto controlling) opinion in Regents of the University of California u. Bakke5o did just that.
Powell's articulation of the diversity rationale for affirmative action altered forever the way that this nation discusses issues of
race, and indeed, of difference generally. The diversity frame is
49 See Associated Press, Quotes on Gay Sex Ban Ruling, June 26, 2003, available at
http:/lwww.sodomylaws.org/lawrenceflawrence.htm. Including quotations such as the following:
"If the people have no right to regulate sexuality then ultimately the institution of
marriage is in peril, and with it, the welfare of the coming generations of children."
Tom Minnery, vice president of public policy at Focus on the Family.
"Today's Supreme Court decision overturning a Texas law against homosexual
sodomy is a defeat for public morality and America's families. This ill-conceived decision
will have serious repercussions upon public health and welfare in Texas and other states
that still criminalize sodomy." Rev. Louis P. Sheldon, chairman of Traditional Values
Coalition.
"This ruling opens the door for new advances toward full equality and should be
viewed as a challenge to legislators to help pass important legal protections for GLBT
(gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender) Americans-like employment nondiscrimination
laws and comprehensive hate crimes legislation." Elizabeth Birch, executive director of
the Human Rights Campaign.
so See 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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so pervasive that it is nearly impossible to have a debate about
affirmative action without discussing diversity, even if only to
discredit it. This is particularly true because nearly every major
American institution-businesses, schools, non-profits, law firms,
the military-frames issues of race, gender, class, affirmative action, ad infinitum, as issues of diversity.5I
What is so brilliant about diversity, and what makes the
frame so effective, is that it is highly politic. Diversity talks
about difference in a way that affirms commonality and community. Diversity also fits in neatly with the American myth of the
cultural melting-pot. Most importantly, though, for a glass-halffull nation, diversity is positive, hopeful, and validating; it manages to convey a sense that we are all different and all the same.
The term "difference," on the other hand, a plausible linguistic
substitute for diversity, has only negative cultural connotations.
Difference lacks any communal connotation; it just emphasizes a
kind of solitary individualism that is antithetical to the American
creed: e pluribus unum.
For all this country's homogeneity, xenophobia, racism, and
self-segregation, people are taught that our diversity is a positive, even a constitutive American asset. Indeed, these beliefs, in
part, facilitate the American process of immigration and integration. You can be an American and hold on to essential elements
of your past identity, even as that past gradually recedes. By
contrast, in Europe, immigrants can never be considered truly
European.
As a result, it would be "un-American" to be against diversity: to do so would be inconsistent with a central part of the
American sense of self, contrary to the American narrative, if you
will. We frequently see similar rhetorical techniques in political
debate. Advocates of a certain political position frame that position in a way that no one can say that they are against it without
seemingly betraying widely-held social mores. The classic case
occurs in the abortion rights context. What American can say
they are against "choice" or oppose "life"?
Thus, Justice Powell's diversity rationale is a prominent example of a court not just shaping or catalyzing the public discourse to serve the interests of minorities, but substantially altering it. Diversity succeeds because it is perfectly adapted to
thrive in our culture; it renders a difficult and painful national
discussion about race largely irrelevant. With diversity, affirmative action became something that enhanced an education and
51 See, e.g., supra note 7; infra note 88 and accompanying text; infra note 137 and
accompanying text.
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the workplace, not a discussion about the terrible and endless
debt that white people owed to minorities, especially MricanAmericans.
As Kenneth Karst argues in Law's Promise, Law's Expression, "[t]he clear subtext of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion was
that he was out to save affirmative action. He plainly thought
that 'diversity' admissions would blur the lines of racial division"
by dismantling the opposition between merit and racial preference.52 Diversity, then, is a way to define race as a meritorious
characteristic that adds something to the educational and social
experience. In this way, the diversity rationale seeks to persuade
the white audience that is being asked to bear the "burden" of affirmative action that it is, in fact, benefiting from the program.
In a sense, then, unlike in Lawrence, the Court's aggressive
reformulation of racial discourse is in fact consistent with the
normative foundation of Sunstein's minimalist jurisprudence.
Sunstein advocates a minimalist approach because, normatively,
he believes the Court should not "crowd out" political discussions
or foment any political controversy or change; the Court's role is
to soothe passions. This kind of politically restorative effect is
something that Grutter's permutation of Powell's diversity rationale achieves, but without minimalism. Indeed, the results
could not be achieved through such an approach. Judicial minimalism fails when politics are dysfunctional because, in such
cases, political deliberation cannot proceed on a productive
course.
This dysfunction is obvious in the case of racial discourse:
Speaking openly about any form of compensation for current or
past race discrimination is not possible in American democracy.
Racial minorities are too powerless to force the discussion, lacking numbers and financial clout, and the American up-by-yourbootstraps ethos is antithetical to condoning an overt handout on
the basis of race. Given that the Court is the only institution
that can adequately defend minority rights, because of its countermajoritarian role, the Court should involve itself in the political sphere in the way that O'Connor did in Grutter. This involvement is particularly crucial given that, unlike in the gay
rights area, minorities have secured full, formal civil rights.
Those are the rights that most Americans think of as constituting
equality. The substantive benefit that affirmative action confers
is not obviously consistent with that conception of equality; it
looks like favoritism, not corrective action.

52 See KARST, supra note 26, at 105.
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Why Affirmative Action is Still Important to Racial
Minorities

To view the diversity rationale as an uncommon rhetorical
move that is essential to the effort to safeguard minority political
gains, one must of course subscribe to the idea that affirmative
action is a worthwhile policy. Given its well-elaborated pitfalls,
however, it is hard for academics to see it that way. Indeed, affirmative action could only be deemed a policy worth keeping if
one takes on the perspective of the marginalized. Only from that
point of view would a program aimed mainly at the most well-off
within the group be deemed worth maintaining.
It is an understatement to say that only elite minorities
benefit from affirmative action. Only 52% of Latinos and 56% of
black students graduate from high school each year.53 Of these, a
mere 23% of black students and 20% of Latino students graduate
with enough preparation to apply to a four-year college. Needless to say, white students graduate from high school and attend
college in much higher numbers.54
In the face of this stark inequality, the enormous discursive
energy spent on affirmative action as it applies to higher education appears farcical: so much fuss over such a minor attempt at
historical remediation.
Prominent scholars like Richard
Delgado55 openly question whether all this talk siphons energy
away from advocacy for more substantive and broad-based remedial measures. From an economic perspective, distributing minority gains to the relatively privileged within the group is regressive. A more efficient redistributive scheme would utilize
limited minority political capital in order to help those worst off
in the group hierarchy, leaving the minority elite to fend for itself
in the academic marketplace.
Despite affirmative action's facially regressive effects, however, a large percentage of minorities favor the program.56 On its
face, such support might appear to be a simple case of false consciousness. Lower-class blacks and Latinos use the ascendancy
of elites that look like them as a proxy for evaluating their own
mobility or success, sustaining a myth of minority advancement,
even as conditions have, in fact, changed little for blacks and La53 See Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Public High School Graduation and College-Readiness Rates: 1991-2002, at 3 (Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, Working Paper No. 8, 2005), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html!ewp_08.htm.
54 Id.
55 See Delgado, supra note 4, at 1222.
56 See ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND
RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "~ACIAL" CRISIS 147-69 (1997) (examining poll data on affirmative action programs).
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tinos since the civil rights movement.57
But is this really false consciousness? Is there a better reason for most minorities to support affirmative action? If one
takes a larger view of what the fall of affirmative action would
signal about the state of minority political power, it is more plausible to argue that minorities are in a better position to advocate
for further political gains with affirmative action still intact. For
marginalized minorities who derive political power only by advocating as a unified whole,58 it would be foolish to seek the abolition of a politically-conferred advantage, even if it is sub-optimal.
Experience with discrimination, poverty and inequality has dissuaded people of color from being optimistic about the possibility
of garnering more resources in affirmative action's absence.
From this perspective, going backward-that is, ridding themselves of affirmative action-to move forward is unappealing and
reckless. Giving up affirmative action in order to expose the
gross inequality of our system would require the sacrifice of
whatever limited advantage affirmative action conferred, hurting
real students and citizens in the workforce in the service of the
improbable possibility that an absence of minorities in higher
education would inspire more substantive political and social
change.
One must also account for the reaction to affirmative action's
fall by the white majority. Given the prevailing reality of white
domination, the loss of affirmative action would only serve as further evidence of the majority's power. The absence of minorities
in America's universities would be read as proof of inferiority
rather than a symptom of a fundamentally damaged system.
True, minorities might be emboldened by such a defeat to fight
harder in the political arena, but they might also be merely defeated.59
In short, affirmative action is important for minority interests because it is the only tangible advantage that racial minorities have wrested from the political system. That MricanAmericans, Latinos, and other underrepresented minorities have
not been able to gain more from politics is an argument for maintaining affirmative action, not ending it. We should ultimately
interpret the meagerness of affirmative action as a symptom of
57 See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 7-8 (2d ed. 1980).
58 See CATHY J. COHEN, BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS M'D THE BREAKDOWN OJ<'
BLACK POLITICS 10 (1999) (stating that African Americans have traditionally secured po-

litical gains by linking their fates to one another).
59 See id. at 9 (noting that African Americans' linked fate enables group mobilization
for important issues, but also that "the majority of African Americans still lack the political, economic, and social resources necessary to participate actively in" the political process.)
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how little power blacks, Latinos and other racial minorities actually have. Given that limited power, the Court is the only institution that can effectively steer the political discourse in a way
that allows minorities to retain their foothold in the meritocracy.
Ill. THE SCHOLARLY CRITIQUE OF DIVERSITY

As the reader has no doubt gathered, the diversity rationale
for affirmative action has never found favor among law professors. It would not be hyperbolic to claim that diversity is so unpopular in the academy that the infirmity of the reasoning in
Justice Powell's Bakke6o opinion is one of the few subjects upon
which the vast majority of constitutional scholars can agree.61
Indeed, UCLA's Kenneth Karst appears to be the only prominent
constitutional scholar who actively supports it.62 Of course, despite this consensus, scholars arrive at their disapproval from
different directions.63
The critique of the diversity rationale comes in four basic
flavors. The least troubling comes from the far right. These
scholars, perhaps most prominently Lino Graglia, believe that
formal equality is all that the Constitution and the Civil Rights
Act require and permit.64 From this normative perspective, affirmative action is impermissible racial discrimination and the
diversity rationale is a devious lie that furthers an unconstitutional program.65
The second group, which includes the vast majority of scholars, consists of liberals who believe in the substantive goal of affirmative action, that is, in helping to achieve a more egalitarian
society, but believe that the diversity rationale is an illegitimate
or dishonest constitutional basis for the program.66 Critics from
the mainstream left object to diversity because they find the rationale intellectually or morally unfulfilling.67
The third group is headed by Stephen L. Carter, who in his
book, Confessions of an Affirmative Action Baby,6s expressed his
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 14, 16; Graglia, supra note 1, at 58-59; Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1,
34-35 (2002).
62 Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 2003
SUP. CT. REV. 357, 373-75 (2003).
63 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 445-46; LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 55;
Graglia, supra note 1, at 58-59; Schuck, supra note 61, at 27.
64 Graglia, supra note 1, at 57.
60
61

ld.

65
66
67

LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 55-56.

68

STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
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concern that affirmative action, and the diversity rationale in
particular, stigmatized all minorities by casting doubt on their
abilities and implying that there is one monolithic minority perspective.69 Justice Thomas is also a prominent, though more extreme, exponent of this view.7o
The fourth and last group offers the most compelling critique
of affirmative action, making two related points. The first, most
prominently made by Richard Delgado, argues that the conceptual framework of affirmative action casts underrepresented minorities in the role of beneficiary and scripts whites as patrons. n
A full implementation of the radical critique of merit72 (the idea
that the dominant group has constructed the criteria that constitute merit with the express function of maintaining its dominant
position),73 the argument goes, would lead to affirmative action's
outcomes without reinforcing prevailing views of white superiority. The second point, mostly insinuated by critical race scholars,
is that underrepresented minorities should be wary of any program, like affirmative action, that works to uphold the fundamental structure of power by making minimal redistributive concessions.74 This last critique has plainly Marxist, though not
necessarily revolutionary, implications. Mfirmative action, in
this view, is a palliative (or opiate, if you will) that assuages minority aspirations just enough to prevent oppressed groups from
pressing for more radical change.75
Despite the normative differences between these perspectives, however, they have in common the formal belief that the
law should speak some form of "truth." That is, these scholars
share the belief that the Court should provide a rationale for or
against affirmative action that follows logically from underlying
principles, or formal readings of relevant texts. The possibility
that such a "logical" argument may not persuade an audience
Id. at 2.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71 Delgado, supra note 4, at 1224-25.
72 See Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (1990). For example, he states that we can only rank articles "within a particular genre" and that "(t]he vast majority of recognizable genres ... have a specifically white, ideologically moderate or conservative history .... built
into their rules." Id. at 754. See also Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 951 (1991).
73 Richard Delgado, White Interests and Civil Rights Realism: Rodrigo's Bittersweet
Epiphany, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1207-08 (2003). This is a Foucaultian phenomenon
where the diffusion of power works to uphold the essential dynamic of domination. The
radical critique of merit does not suggest that there is a conspiracy to create discriminatory criteria of "merit"; the phenomenon is more insiduous than that because it occurs
without any conscious coordination.
74 See Delgado, supra note 4, at 1224.
75 See id.
69
70
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outside of the academy, or worse, that it may interfere with political discourse in a way that damages the interest of those
whom the program is designed to protect, is not within view of
diversity's critics. As discussed in section I, supra, the politically
independent academic bias towards the exegetical is difficult to
overcome. Academics of either political persuasion rarely consider the possibility that the promulgation of what Sunstein calls
"incompletely theorized agreements"76 is an essential part of
law's functionality.
This failure to consider the full context of the Supreme
Court's institutional role is particularly damaging where affirmative action is concerned because minority legal gains are so tenuous that a mistake in form, a failure to craft a legal rationale that
effectively persuades the proper audience, will mean a failure in
substance; the majority will rally against the program and seek
to repeal it. 77
A.

The Right: Blinded by Colorblindness

Most of the scholars on the right who oppose affirmative action possess a strong and uncritical belief in the ideal of a colorblind society7s and do not seriously engage the idea that racism
may be endemic to our "meritocracy,"79 or consider racism a real
and pervasive phenomenon. Further complicating the perspective of the right is their general belief in an originalist or strictconstructionist approach to constitutional interpretation. It is
inherently difficult for such a theory to make room for the rights
of racial minorities, because the perpetuation of slavery precipitated a pivotal compromise at the Constitutional Convention.
For all their foresight and wisdom, the Founders were also men
of their time who, in order to form a "more perfect" union, agreed
to overrepresent and subsidize southern states by counting a
slave as 3/5ths of a person. Instructively, though Justice Scalia,
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at ch. 2.
Unsurprisingly, despite the political sensitivity of Grutter, such mobilization is
occurring. In Michigan, Jennifer Gratz, the former Gratz plaintiff, has spent the last
three years working full.time to rally Michigan voters to pass a ballot initiative prohibiting Affirmative Action in Michigan universities. Opponents of the measure emphasized
that the only reason that they had a chance of preventing its passage is because they had
spent millions to reframe the issue, emphasizing the negative effects an affirmative action
ban would have on women and on Michigan's economic competitiveness. This political
effort to reframe the issue illustrates how important such frames are to safeguarding minority rights. Without this reframing, passage of the initiative in a state that has a white
majority would be a fait accompli. See Tamar Lewin, Campaign to End Race Preferences
Splits Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at Al.
78 See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 35 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed.
2000).
79 Kennedy, supra note 72, at 709-1 0; Delgado, supra note 72, at 945-46.
76
77
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originalism's most powerful proponent, believes that Brown v.
Board of EducationBo was rightly decided, he has admitted that
the decision cannot be squared with his own approach to constitutional interpretation.s1 In itself, this failure strongly suggests
that it will be difficult for decisions regarding race to follow standard jurisprudential rules. Yet, as a result of their formal and
normative commitments, most conservatives do not take arguments that locate an active role for the Court in defense of minority rights very seriously.s2
Put more pointedly, conservative scholars are generally untroubled by America's persistent racial inequality. This lack of
concern prevents theses scholars from engaging their jurisprudential philosophy with the social reality of racial disparity. As a
result, many of these scholars feel free to conduct a crusade
against affirmative action with moral conviction. Implicitly, this
conviction is driven by empathy for those whites who were
passed over in the admissions process in order to admit an underrepresented minority applicant. These whites are cast as the
"innocents" in the right's affirmative action passion-play.s3 The
devilish villain is the liberal academic establishment that, some
conservatives argue, continues to support affirmative action only
to save itself from the embarrassment its members would feel in
preaching liberal values to a lily-white congregation. From this
perspective, mere shame, and not a normative commitment to social justice, is the primary motivating force behind affirmative
action.
The diversity rationale gets under the skin of these scholars
because (to their credit) they understand how effectively the rationale changes the terms of the affirmative action debate.s4
Conservatives would prefer not to discuss diversity at all. Their
arguments against affirmative action would persuade the white
majority much more readily if they could bypass diversity and
simply dub affirmative action race-based discrimination, where
349 u.s. 294 (1955).
Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin
Scalia, THE NEW YoRKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40 (stating that Scalia has admitted that his
originalist interpretation of the Constitution cannot be squared with Brown v. Board of
Education).
82 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 18, at 135 (commenting on the view of some conservatives that "the Court's role in protecting minorities should consist only in removing barriers to their participation in the political process.").
83 See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 298-99
(1990) (arguing that the diversity rationale paints whites as innocents and therefore
damages America's racial discourse).
84 See Graglia, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing the idea that the "diversity" rationale
for affirmative action has become merely a tool for higher learning institutions to prevent
embarrassment by admitting minorities).
80

81
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whites suffer in place of people of color. If, alternatively, the program were grounded in a history of discrimination, conservative
scholars could assert the innocence of current generations, making the case that whites of today should not pay for the sins of
their fathers. Many of these scholars are plainly chagrined to
have to devote their energies to dismantling the diversity rationale, which they consider to be a bald-faced lie.s5
All of these normative beliefs are well shrouded by this
group's formal commitments; they position themselves as advocates for neutral principles in a world they perceive to be equal.
Moreover, these scholars tend to downplay the fact that the Supreme Court does not mandate affirmative action; in public
school settings, at least, the program can be abolished by the legislature or in ballot initiatives.s6 Indeed, some liberal scholars
argue that the Court's scrutiny of affirmative action is inappropriate because the program is already subject to democratic safeguards. Conservatives may shy away from this discussion because the diversity rationale makes legislative advocacy much
more difficult for conservatives. Lobbying is tougher when liberal opponents can say that legislators who abolish affirmative
action are against diversity.
Plainly, the normative perspective of this article is far removed from the viewpoint of conservative scholars on racial issues, and this article does not pretend to proselytize to this flock.
It will, however, illustrate to conservatives how affirmative action works to facilitate many of their other strongly-held convictions. Most prominently, affirmative action solidifies the fundamental order of American society, an order which continues to
favor the white elite in nearly every way, and of which nearly all
of these critics are a part. That stable social order would be most
disrupted by affirmative action's absence. Contrary to the view
of some conservatives, affirmative action is less about saving professors from the embarrassment of fewer black students than it
is about giving some substance to the myth of equal opportunities
for American social advancement. As Justice O'Connor rather
candidly put it in Grutter, universities and law schools
represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders ....
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of
the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
See id. at 80-82. See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 397.
See Graglia, supra note 1, at 59-64. Though Graglia concedes that affirmative
action is constitutionally permissible, he still insists that a plain reading of the Civil
Rights Act should lead the Court to conclude that any discrimination based on race is impermissible by statute.
85
86
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open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.
All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide
this training .... Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society
may participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America.87

Mfirmative action, quite apart from being a threat to the
prevailing social order, plays a prominent role in maintaining
that order's essential structure. The glut of amicus briefs the
Court received from the American establishmentss defending the
law school's position is strong evidence of the veracity of these
assertions.
If anything, the transparency with which Grutter put forth
its view that affirmative action is socially stabilizing should spur
the mainstream left to join critical race scholars in questioning
whether a program that is so well favored by the establishment is
something for which progressives should be comfortable advocating. Indeed, it is a testament to the centrism of the American
scholarly discourse that conservatives can even make these arguments against racial preferences in the face of evidence that
such preferences serve establishment interests so very well.
Conservatives should also consider how damaging and costly
it is to maintain a society with a permanent underclass. It is
easy to forget that racial tensions have produced substantial violence and destruction of property in this country before.B9 In fact,
affirmative action in the university setting was initiated in order
to dampen increasing black militancy.
Harvard, Yale and
Princeton only began admitting students of color in significant
numbers at the historical moment when the black power movement gained traction in the political sphere.9o Blindness to the
social implications of a formal legal policy, then, can be highly
disruptive to other normative preferences of conservative scholars, like law and order.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-33 (2003) (emphasis added).
See Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 and 02-516), 2003 WL
399056; Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 and 02-516)
2003 WL 1787554.
89 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and Injustice,
25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 165 (2005) (discussing the "Zoot Suit" Race Riots); Police
Make Arrests at Neo-Nazi Rally, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 25, 2006, http://msnbc.msn.com/
id/11562166/.
90 See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND
EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 407 (2005).
87
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For an example of a multicultural world sans affirmative action, conservatives should look to France. The Gauls have taken
a radically formalistic approach to racial equality. Apart from
forbidding affirmative action, the French do not even collect government statistics organized by race or ethnicity;91 they take the
metaphor of blind justice quite literally. Yet the recent riots in
Paris's cites, Corbusian housing projects outside the city center
filled with Arab and Mrican immigrants who were granted citizenship but who lacked any real possibility of belonging to
French society, are forcing French leaders to consider that formal
equality may be worthless, and even counter-productive, unless it
facilitates the material advancement of racial minorities and allows them to fully integrate into French society.92
As a result of the riots, the French are considering implementing an aggressive affirmative action program.93 Acknowledging the power of the visual, just four months after the November 2005 riots, the French passed the Equal Opportunities
act, which requires the Conseil Superieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA),
France's broadcasting regulatory authority, to ensure the promotion of minorities to on-screen television roles.94
Moreover, scholars on the right and left who value social
stability should not seek to devalue or trivialize the power of aesthetics. Humans are highly visual creatures,95 and as a result,
aesthetics can have a substantive effect in stabilizing the power
structure. In a state with democratic ideals, whose citizens receive their news mainly through television, people want to see
those who look like them in positions of power. When people like
Justice Thomas dismiss affirmative action as aesthetic window
dressing, they miss the point (or understand it too well).96 Of
course, the aesthetic power of affirmative action is only positive
when you believe that the current social order is, fundamentally,
worth preserving. Whether it is in the interests of minorities to
91 David Orland, Connerly's Racial Privacy Initiative: The Unhappy French Connection, VDARE.COM, May 28, 2003, http://www.vdare.com/misc/orland_racial_privacy.htm;
Thomas J. Sugrue, Burn, Bebe, Burn, DISSENT MAGAZINE, Winter 2006, http://www.
dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=l50.
92 John von Heyking, The Riots of Ramadan, JOHN M. ASHBROOK CENTER FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, November 2005, http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/guest/05/vonheyking/
ramadan.html.
93 See Associated Press, French Presidential Hopeful Visits U.S., Sept. 9, 2006,
available at http://www.townhall.com/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ContentGuid=e93fcOaOded4-417e-al6e-5ef9736e002c.
94 See Jeremy Harding, Color Bind, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 2006, at
40, available at http://www.cjr.org/issues/2006/4/harding.asp.
95 Approximately half of the human brain is dedicated to processing visual stimuli.
Human Health Research, Vision, http://www.salk.edu/faculty/research/vision.php (last
visited Sept. 29, 2006).
96 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 354 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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continue to participate within these structures of power
pressing question that is beyond the scope of this article.
B.

IS

a

The Liberal Mainstream

The liberal mainstream reluctantly embraces affirmative action as a policy but believes that a more "honest" constitutional
rationale would better validate minority interests by emphasizing how the legacy of slavery and a history of colonialism and
xenophobia have damaged underrepresented minorities in a way
that requires compensation.97 Professor Kim Forde-Mazrui 1s
typical of these scholars when he writes:
The pursuit of diversity is not only less effective at remedying past
discrimination than pursuing the latter goal directly, it may ultimately doom the remedying of past discrimination by creating the illusion that past discrimination has been remedied when it has not.98

Forde-Mazrui is particularly concerned with the increase in
recent African and Jamaican immigrants enrolling at elite
schools like Harvard. This troubles Forde-Mazrui because he
wants affirmative action to be "just," and in his view justice
means that scarce compensatory resources should be distributed
to those who have actually suffered historical injustice perpetrated by citizens of the United States.99 From this vantage
point, recent African immigrants, who are not descended from
American slaves, are taking away resources that more properly
belong to others.1oo Or, alternatively, if such immigrants meet
ordinary admissions criteria, that institutions are counting these
applicants towards their racial goals and not increasing the proportion of black descendants of American slaves.
Diversity diminishes the possibility of historical remediation
in this view because diversity, at least in elite circles, is simply
code for historical remediation, yet applicants seeking the preference are not required to present any proof that they are actually
descended from slaves.101 Thus, when Harvard reports in brochures and to its trustees that X percent of its students are black,
elites assume that the admissions office is implementing proper
remediation measures, when in fact those resources have gone to
many people that have suffered no past "harm."1o2
97 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 3, at 685 (arguing that affirmative action is justifiable as a means of making amends for past harm); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at
471.
98 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 3, at 750.
99 Id. at 709-10.
100 Id. at 744, 749.
101 See LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 46.
102 This view is a bit limited in that it ignores the fact of present discrimination, when
it is clear that such discrimination would apply to recent immigrants as well. Moreover,
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Jed Rubenfeld criticizes diversity from a different angle. In
Rubenfeld's view, diversity's "duplicity" attracts unnecessary attention to the policy:
Pleading diversity of backgrounds merely invites heightened scrutiny
into the true objectives behind affirmative action. This heightened
scrutiny would quite properly reveal the existence of a race- or grouprelated purpose, rather than a genuine interest in achieving a representative diversity of perspectives)03

Professor Rubenfeld believes that sincere concern for diversity of perspectives would require institutions to give preference
to neo-Nazi and Christian fundamentalist applicants.I04
Despite their differences, then, Rubenfeld and Forde-Mazrui
agree that diversity harms affirmative action because it has a
distorted relationship to the legitimate philosophical underpinnings of what should be a remedial program. They argue that
this distortion harms the reputation of affirmative action, works
against the possibility of social justice, and invites unwarranted
controversy and contentiousness.
Apart from these rhetorical concerns, most liberal scholars
also believe that other policies would better compensate underrepresented minorities while avoiding the discriminatory pitfalls
of affirmative action. For instance, Professor Rubenfeld argues
forcefully that affirmative action is a constitutionally permissible
program while confessing that
[i]f I had to choose, I would probably vote to scrap the entire patchwork of affirmative action measures in this country in favor of a massive capital infusion into inner-city day care and educational facilities.I05

Though Rubenfeld is careful to separate his opinions about
the formal propriety of affirmative action from the normative
wisdom of implementing the program, his policy suggestion and
his distaste for the diversity rationale have their roots in the
same political misapprehension.
From an objective viewpoint, Professor Rubenfeld, Professor
Forde-Mazrui and other liberal academics are correct that af-

nearly all Mricans, whether enslaved or not, were negatively affected by western colonization and the slave trade.
103 Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 471-72.
104 Id. at 471. Is it really the case that universities cannot legitimately value the perspective that minorities carry with them-first hand experience of the effects of a racialized society--over the often reactionary and freely chosen beliefs of Christian Conservatives and Neo-Nazis? In any event, in the case of Christian conservatives applying to
elite, largely secular universities, strongly-held beliefs are usually plus factors on admissions committees.
10s Id.
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firmative action and the diversity rationale are sub-optimal political outcomes. The program itself does little to ameliorate the
centuries of discrimination that were so damaging to blacks,I06 it
raises questions about the performance of racial stereotypes and
the possibility of stigma, and it may calcify racial identity in a socially undesirable way. Moreover, it is vulnerable to the underinclusiveness argument: Why is racial diversity privileged over
other forms? Worst of all, the program appears to fully satisfy no
particular constituency because it is compromised on all sides.
But Forde-Mazrui and Rubenfeld's policy alternatives, each
of which would require an expensive and sustained national focus on the plight of blacks and other underrepresented minorities, imply that they have critiqued affirmative action and diversity without having seriously considered what kind of race-based
remediation programs are politically possible in twenty-first century America. This lack of consideration is surprising, as the impossibility of implementing a program that fulfills either of these
professor's utopian suggestions should be quite plain.
The past twenty-five years of American political history have
been defined by a growing political consensus, spurred by the
Republican party, that the central idea of the Great Societythat government can play an active and positive role in helping
its citizens-is bankrupt. In accord with this shift, affirmative
action itself, a program that costs very little, has been under
siege during the same period. It is highly unlikely that in this
political climate a white majority would implement a radical program designed primarily to aid negatively-racialized minorities.I07
For a more concrete example of the difficulties more "substantive" remediation would encounter, consider the suggestion
that school funding be equalized between racial groups, or at
106 Professor Rubenfeld argues that helping African-Americans should be the chief
goal of affirmative action. ld. at 471-72. This perspective is limited and he fails to appreciate the extent to which other minorities, particularly Latinos, also have a long history of second class status. See Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil
Rights: Assessing the NeoLiberal Case far Radical Exclusion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 489, 491-93
(2004) (reviewing GEORGE YANCEY, WHO IS WHITE?: LATINOS, ASIANS, AND THE NEW
BLACKINONBLACK DIVIDE (2003)).
107 It is true that some political attention has been paid to the plight of inner-city
schools by the "compassionate conservative" Bush administration, but even that example
proves my point. No Child Left Behind is a mandate for superior performance without
any money to fund the remediation that the law requires. Scores have gone up in some
jurisdictions, but per-pupil funding has not come close to being equalized. And in some
ways equal isn't even enough. As Forde-Mazrui contends in his article, there are all kinds
of socializations and day to day interactions that black children lack and white children
have; to really reach the goal of equality of opportunity would require a "massive infusion
of resources into poor black communities" for several generations. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 3, at 749-50.
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least significantly improved. In the absence of a state or federal
supreme court decision that mandates equal school funding, individualistic parents will continue to be unwilling to subsidize
the educations of students outside of their self-segregated (by
race and class) school district boundaries. Even with such a
court decision (highly unlikely even in the most liberal states),
parents with means would lobby for lower property taxes or private school vouchers. This change would shift suburban school
districts from a de-facto private school model, where small segregated community boundaries keep out the poor and the nonwhite, to an actual private school model, where taxes will subsidize private education or simply be lowered to allow parents to
buy that education themselves. The well-entrenched freedom to
direct a child's educationws will ensure that the Court would not
prevent this migration from occurring. Moreover, marginal minority communities do not possess the political or economic capital to fight against these outcomes.
The failure of liberal scholars to understand how tightly circumscribed minority political power is prevents them from considering the likely possibility that affirmative action-meager
and problematic as it is-is all that the polity can implement.
Once scholars acknowledge this possibility, the notion that the
rationale for affirmative action should satisfy the preferences of
academia diminishes. Instead, the way in which a rationale for
affirmative action interacts with the political sphere, where minorities are embattled, becomes paramount.
With this change in criteria, nearly all the philosophical
criticisms that liberal scholars wield against the diversity rationale become virtues. In particular, diversity's conceptual flexibility, the fact that it can mean nearly anything and be inclusive of
an infinite array of characteristics, is a terrific asset in the political arena; if everyone is "diverse" in one way or another, preferences are less threatening. For her part, Justice O'Connor uses
this flexibility with great skill in Grutter. But before we delve
into a close analysis of diversity's myriad benefits, it will be useful to uncover the political flaws of grounding affirmative action
in the preferred liberal rationales, ones that emphasize dark histories or continued discrimination.
1.

The Shortcomings of Historically Anchored
Mfirmative Action Rationales
There is a legend at Yale Law School that upon learning of
Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984-in a race that was widely
108

See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972).
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regarded a fait accompli-a member of the faculty exclaimed to
another professor "How could this man be reelected? I don't
know a single person who voted for him and none of my friends
knows anyone who voted for him. Do you?" The answer from his
colleague, of course, was no, he did not know a single person who
supported Ronald Reagan. Whether or not this story is true (and
it likely is not), it continues to circulate around the law school,
serving as a cautionary tale to those who enter Yale's cloistered
environs: beware that you do not come to believe that the ideas
and values expounded upon within these walls bear any direct
relationship to the world outside of them.
Though Yale is particularly guilty of divorcing theory from
practice, the legal academy as a whole has become more like
Yale, not less.109 The failure of liberal scholars to critically assess
their favored rationales for affirmative action stems directly from
this inability to appreciate that their values may differ significantly from those of the public at large. What is particularly
troubling about this difficulty is that in law, unlike, say, Philosophy or English, this ivory-tower distance will frequently have a
negative impact on the quality of legal scholarship because the
law is not a system of reasoning that the academy actually governs. The negative impact of this myopia is clearly illustrated by
scholarship that advocates for an affirmative action rationale
grounded in a history of racial exclusion or evidence of continued
discrimination.
The appeal of affirmative action rationales grounded in a
history of oppression or continuing discrimination is, unfortunately, limited to the liberal scholars who advocate for them.
These perspectives have limited persuasive power because liberal
legal academics are a unique group of people with values and
epistemologies that differ dramatically from most of the American population, and even most college-educated citizens. Law
professors generally value rigorous logical thinking, have jobs
that are, for the most part, guaranteed for life, and are unusually
self-conscious about the privilege they enjoy. Though academics
are overwhelmingly white and male, their extreme privilege
means that they do not share the insecurities that their less accomplished brethren have felt in the aftermath of the civil rights
movement, women's liberation, and the disintegration of the old
social contract guaranteeing long-term employment and generous
benefits.
The deep-seated resentments that have emerged from the
109

See Richard A. Posner, Madison Lecture: Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 1 (1998).
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transformative "progress" of the past half-century have been exploited brilliantly by the Republican party since the enactment of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Indeed, President Johnson predicted
the electoral realignment that would take place over the coming
decades, commenting to an aide that by signing the act he was
handing over the South, once a Democratic party stronghold, to
the Republican party for "a generation."no
To cultivate the status anxiety that resulted from the emasculating social upheavals of the 1960's, Republicans created a
strategy that Kenneth L. Karst dubs the "social issues
agenda."1u Republicans appealed to the racist, anti-feminist,
and, later, anti-gay sentiments of white-male voters by using
code words to bring these voters into a fold where their damaged
egos could be mended. The central logic of the Republican strategy is to turn white men into victims of the new liberal establishment by convincing them that they are victimized by dogooders who have threatened their hegemony with feminism, affirmative action, and "political correctness."
Affirmative action is particularly threatening to the status of
this group of men, especially those among them who are poor or
working class. More than any other group, these whites benefited from the social norms that used to prohibit women and minorities from competing with them for jobs. Though it is unlikely
that many members of this group could be sold on affirmative action in any form, grounding the program in the victimization of
underrepresented minorities is particularly galling to them because they have become accustomed to seeing themselves as victims of 1960s social transformations, and they conceptualize
blacks, other minorities, and women as ungrateful or undeserving beneficiaries of those changes. Creating a public discourse
about affirmative action based on past or current victimization
raises this group's ire and gives them the tools to recruit others
into their coalition.
Moreover, an affirmative action rationale rooted in minority
victimization allows the program's white male opponents to recruit others to their cause because that justification runs up
against other deeply-held and widely-shared American convictions. We can think of these socially constitutive beliefs as an
110

Johnson is said to have told an aide, shortly after signing the Civil Rights Act of

1964, that "(w]e have just lost the South for a generation." John W. Lee, III, Class War-

fare 1988-2005 over Top Individual Income Tax Rates: Teeter-Totter from Soak-the-Rich to
Robin-Hood-in-Reverse, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 47, 125 (2006).
111 KARST, supra note 26, at 27-28 (arguing that the Republican party has tapped
into this race animosity quite successfully by using code words that support its social is·
sues agenda).
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expanded version of the "American narrative" that I alluded to
earlier in this article. In this narrative, our history is a parade of
economic, social and political advancement, and the meritocracy
is fair and just, because economic outcomes are linked to hard
work and persistence, not the accident of birth.
These myths, coupled with our laissez-faire economic system,
result in a populace that believes that people control their own
destiniesn2 (fatalism is for the Europeans). F. Scott Fitzgerald's
famous line, "[t]here are no second acts in American lives,"n3
may be the most inapposite American popular quotation. Americans are highly adept at reinvention; second acts are commonplace, and third, fourth and fifth acts are not unheard of. Americans' self-identity and status are malleable; people do not believe
that they are tethered to their pasts. All these beliefs are held by
Americans of every race, and every income level, even though
nearly every notion is contradicted by statistical evidence or a
frank assessment of our history.n4
Given, then, the American aversion to history, conviction
that hard work can will us out of any circumstance, and penchant for self-reinvention, it is unlikely that a wealth-transfer
policy directed on the basis of race, emphasizing a terrible history
of slavery and discrimination, will gain traction in the court of
public opinion; it is un-American to dwell on the negative, ugly
past. Such an argument, enshrined in a political opinion, would
lead to the kind of unproductive political conflict engendered by
Bowers and Roe.
2. The Difficulty with the Continuing Discrimination
Rationale
The other liberal suggestion, that the Court ground affirmative action in social science research illustrating how conscious
and unconscious discrimination continue to adversely affect underrepresented minorities, is also wrongheaded. In essence,
adopting such a rationale requires the Court to publicly accuse
most Americans of being racist. A discourse framed by such an
accusation will be even more inflammatory than one framed by a
history of discrimination because there are now strong social
norms against overt racism. Accusing people of being racist is a
112 See Schuck, supra note 61, at 30 (reflecting the view of some affirmative action
opponents who acknowledge a history of racial deprivation, but who believe that in recent
years blacks have made "stunning political, economic, and social advances" that suggest
that "special preferences are no longer warranted").
113 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE LAST TYCOON 163 (Edmund Wilson ed., 1941).
114 See
Class Matters: A Special Section, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/indexes/2005/05/15/nationallclass/ (supporting the conclusion
that Americans misapprehend the extent of American socio-economic mobility).
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prescription for contentiousness because people refuse to believe
that they harbor racial bias. Even in cases where people do admit to holding racial stereotypes, they do not conceptualize them
as stereotypes; they believe them to be true. In this way, discrimination is invisible to the majority that perpetrates it.
Ironically, this denial of bias is growing stronger just as evidence of bias has grown more concrete. Mahzarin Banaji, a psychology professor at Harvard, has conducted path-breaking work
that proves how deep-seated and wide ranging our unconscious
biases are.n5 According to her studies, Americans hold strong
negative biases against racial minorities, the elderly, and social
groups to which they do not belong.ll6 Despite the strength of
her research and the persuasiveness of her analysis, however,
Professor Banaji's own Harvard undergraduates refuse to believe
that they themselves actually harbor these biases,117 Professor
Banaji's students do not doubt her research, of course. On the
contrary, most of them believe that America is rife with racism;
they just do not believe themselves to be racist.na Indeed, according to Professor Banaji, her students become quite defensive
when she confronts them about their results on her bias tests. If
the most privileged and intelligent undergraduates in the world
are touchy about confronting their own unconscious bias, it is
highly probable that the public at large will be even more unwilling to accept that their way of perceiving the world is biased in
important ways.
Another recent study also uncovered significant bias against
job applicants with ''black" first names. In "Are Emily and Greg
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?"119 co-authors
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan found that Emily
and Greg enjoyed a sizable advantage over their counterparts
with traditionally African-American names. Bertrand and Mullainathan sent out nearly five thousand resumes in response to
help wanted ads in the Boston Globe and the Chicago Tribune.
The resumes were equalized for qualifications, though no resume
sent to the same employer was identical; the most significant difference between the resumes was whether the applicants names
115 See Mahzarin Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE AGENDA,
Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 8, available at www.apa.org/science/psa/janOl.pdf.
116 Id. at 9; see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489,
1513-14 (2005) (discussing and cataloging implicit bias studies by Banaji and others).
117 Banaji, supra note 115, at 8.
118 Id.
119 :\l[arianne Bertrand & Sendhil _:1/[ullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? l, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9873, 2004), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathanlpapers/
emilygreg.pdf, (showing that similarly qualified black candidates are disfavored even
when their educational qualifications are significantly superior to white candidates).
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were typically "white" or "bhwk."
The authors found that "white" applicants were 50% more
likely to receive a request for an interview than "black" applicants with equivalent qualifications.12o More distressingly, while
white applicants with higher quality resumes received 30% more
callbacks as a result of their qualifications, black applicants garnered a smaller gain for the same increase in qualifications.121
Put succinctly, according to the authors, "the gap between White
and African-Americans widens with resume quality."122 Again,
despite strong social norms that discourage discrimination on the
basis of race, the authors of this study found evidence of pervasive racism, even without direct visual stimulus. All these biases, however, are likely invisible to those who hold them.
This invisibility is doubly pernicious. First, it weakens the
resolve to implement affirmative action programs because most
people will not believe that race discrimination still exists when
they do not see for themselves the evidence of overt discrimination. Second, the weakened resolve to implement affirmative action works to consolidate the existing racial order, further entrenching the invisible biases that created these racial disparities
in the first place. Under these conditions, an affirmative action
program anchored in history or evidence of continuing discrimination is destined to faiL
To further complicate matters, a backward-looking rationale
or one based on evidence of continuing discrimination invites
empirical scrutiny by structuring affirmative action in a way that
encourages people to think of the program as a means of repaying the debt owed by whites to disadvantaged minorities. This
"debt" frame is explicitly favored by Professor Forde-Mazrui, and
implicitly favored by other liberal scholars who approve of affirmative action and disapprove of the diversity rationale. These
scholars favor this structure because it is familiar: every lawyer
thinks of equity in terms of tort law. Attorneys are trained to
ask: "How can we make the plaintiff whole? By what amount has
the plaintiff been harmed?"
The problem with applying this formulation to affirmative
action in higher education is that the public process of calculating the individual "damages" that each person deserves would
quantify people in a way that most Americans would consider
grotesque.12s Even assuming that such individualized consideraId.
Id. at 3.
Id.
123 See Peter Skerry, The Strange Politics of Affirmative Action, THE WILSON
120
121
122
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tion were possible, the calculations involved are daunting and
uncomfortable. One would need to quantify the amount of bias
that every individual minority actually encounters in order to
discern the size of the societal debt that needs to be repaid. Such
a calculus raises countless questions: Does society owe a debt to
Puerto Ricans and Mexicans (for de facto colonialism), but not to
certain first generation Cuban-Americans, who are relatively
well off? Do Latinos without accents and more "European" features get less preference than mestizos and other Latinos with
more "indigenous" features? What about Latinos without a
Spanish surname? Do dark-skinned blacks inspire more racial
animus than light-skinned blacks?
The empirical resolution of such questions may make for an
interesting econometric exercise, but it is too complex and racially essentializing to be politically viable. These are discussions that the judiciary cannot have. Minorities would not want
to be subjected to such an analysis, or they would bicker about
the values assigned to different characteristics, and whites, who
mostly do not believe that racism exists, would object to paying
off the "debt" in such a complex way. Again, from the American
perspective, complexity may be a sign of fraudulence. Put simply, quantifying harm in this way runs against the American
preference for self-definition. Americans want to present their
personal stories on their own terms; no one wants to be just another number. Justice O'Connor sensed the importance of this
value.l24 This difference alone explains why she voted to overturn the Michigan undergraduate program, which used an explicitly numerical approach to admissions, and upheld the law
school's "whole student" approach in Grutter. It is unimportant
whether the different approaches produced differences in fact,
Grutter properly locates some metaphysical procedural value in
the holistic, non-numerical approach practiced at the law school.
This analysis of the pitfalls of more "academic" rationales for
affirmative action also illustrates why the judicial rationale for
affirmative action is so important. Affirmative action is being
asked to do what is nearly impossible. It must seek to solve a
problem that no one, excepting those who lack political and economic power, as well as a few elites, believes to exist. Plainly,
under these conditions, a politically persuasive affirmative action
policy cannot be constructed by assembling past and present social science data to make an empirical case for compensation and
redistribution. On the contrary, the rationale that validates afQUARTERLY, Winter 1997, at 39, 40, available at
Skerry_aa.pdf.
124 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).

http://www.brookings.edu/gs/
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firmative action needs to be constructed around the viewpoint of
the majority. By implementing the program without an explicitly
empirical focus, the program can survive by staying off the political balance sheet, where scrutiny of the policy's intricacies could
lead to its abolition. The Court should embrace diversity precisely because that rationale is silent on the deeper contradictions and difficulties surrounding a subject-race-that is taboo.
3. The Grutter Dissent and the Problem with Numerical
Emphasis
The Grutter dissent illustrates the problems with a rhetoric
that encourages a numerical approach towards affirmative action, taking as their starting point a deconstruction of the University of Michigan law school's stated interest in attaining a
critical mass of minority students. "[C]ritical mass," the dissent
claims, is a "veil" that obscures the law school's attempt at "naked ... racial balancing."125 In particular, a close look at the law
school's numbers leads the dissenters to conclude that black applicants are favored over Latinos with higher qualifications. The
implication of this finding, from the dissenter's point of view, is
that a program that discriminates between underrepresented minorities must be pernicious.
In fact, however, the law school admissions committee's
"balancing'' may reflect real differentials between the black and
Latino racial experience, precisely the kinds of differences that a
hyper-accurate, empirical affirmative action would seek to quantify. There is sociological evidence that blacks may suffer significantly more racial discrimination in American society than Latinos do.12s For example, there are probably more Latinos than
blacks that can pass for white, African-Americans have a history
of slavery that most Latinos lack, and white-Latina intermarriage rates are significantly higher than black-white intermarriage rates, and still climbing.121
Yet, as the dissent shows, most Americans would probably be
uncomfortable with a public discussion of why some minorities
might deserve more preference than others. Supreme Court
precedent reflects this discomfort by prohibiting "racial balancing."128 If Justice O'Connor had actually adopted a historical or
125
126
127

Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See Delgado, supra note 106, at 497-98 nn.48--49.

Approximately 30% of marriages involving U.S.-born Latinos are inter-Hispanic,
while only 7% of blacks marry a spouse of another race. Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S. Racial and Hispanic Intermarriage, 60 POPU·
LATION BULLETIN, June 2005, at 3, 12, 27, available at http://www.prb.org/pdf05/
60.2NewMarriages.pdf.
128 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.

2006]

A Matter of Rhetoric

223

ongoing discrimination rationale in Grutter, she would have had
to engage in this debate about differential preferences in the majority decision. Imagine the formal challenges of writing a majority decision that rationalized every inter-racial choice that the
law school makes through a complex social-scientific exegesis,
like the one presented above. Such discussions might satisfy liberal elites who are comfortable seeing the world in shades of
gray, but to the black-white public, these complex explanations
would do much to discredit the program and encourage a political
movement to prohibit it.
More troubling still, public discussions of differential preferences might serve to divide racial minorities among themselves.
Encouraging interracial strife of this sort damages minority interests as a whole because racial minorities can only have significant power by asserting a unified front. The Grutter dissent presents its finding in a way that suggests that Latinos should lobby
for the spots that blacks "took away" from them or join whites in
opposing the program. The dissent fails to emphasize that while
Latinos may not receive quite the boost that Mrican-Americans
do, Latinos still receive preference relative to many white candidates. Thus, even if Latinos receive less preference, they are better off working with blacks to keep affirmative action than they
would be were they to join with whites in seeking to abolish the
program.
Blacks in particular fear this emphasis on difference because
they have seen potential allies back down before. Whites have a
long history of giving other disfavored groups subtle preferences
and the promise of future entry into the white race in exchange
for that group's refusal to align its interests with blacks.129 During the colonial period, slave masters gave certain privileges to
their white indentured servants to keep them from uniting with
blacks against the landowners (this is, unsurprisingly, a favorite
example among Marxists).130 Nobel Laureate Toni Morrison expressed this history of differentiation in this way:
If there were no black people here in this country, it would have
been Balkanized. The immigrants would have torn each other's
throats out, as they have done everywhere else. But in becoming an
American, from Europe, what one has in common with that other immigrant is contempt for me-it's nothing else but color. Wherever
they were from, they would stand together. They could all say, "I am
not that." So in that sense, becoming an American is based on an atti-

129 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. GARDINER, REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF WHITE
SUPREMACY 7-9 (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.uua.org/programs/justice/antiracism/
Greenfiled%20Group%20Paper.pdf.
130

Id.
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tude: an exclusion of me.131

When highly numerical analytic models are applied to race,
they will always highlight the significant differences between the
racial experiences of distinct minority groups, because such differences do exist. But because the temptation to assimilate into
the system by aligning one's interests with the majority is so
strong (see, e.g., Jews, Irish, Polish, ad infinitum), emphasizing
differences between minority groups obscures their shared experiences, preventing them from joining together. Inter-racial
solidarity, in short, presents a classic problem of collective action.
Minorities must join together in order to create a public good,
and through it all members can gain advantage. But members
who can pass in certain contexts for the majority race can opt out
of contributing to the common pool and thereby undermine the
strength of the coalition. Thankfully, it seems as if blacks and
Latinos are learning to forge common alliances (see, e.g., the recent Los Angeles mayoral race);I32 but these will always be tenuous if discourse is structured in a way that magnifies the differences between the black and Latino racial experience.
Lastly, and most importantly for racial minorities, the historical or current bias rationale perpetuates a conception of minorities as damaged, flawed, and deficient. As one scholar put it:
[A] common theme of the last fifty years (but with roots in the writings of W.E.B. DuBois at the turn of the century) has been the effort
by racial liberals to construct Mrican Americans as damaged and to
use that "damage imagery" to build support for progressive racial policies. The arguments in favor of school desegregation in Brown v.
Board of Education and affirmative action in the mid-1960s, for example, were premised in part on the notion that Mrican Americans
had been damaged by racial discrimination and segregation.133

While such a conception provides substantial philosophical
justification for affirmative action, that rhetoric does harm to the
minorities it is designed to help. The concept of diversity, on the
other hand, transfigures this damage into a positive characteristic, a battle-scar to take pride in; it is something that grants its
victims a special kind of knowledge.
In sum, the pet rationales of liberal scholars do harm to minority interests by inviting a quantitative inquiry, framing the
131 Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1602 n.59 (1997).
132 Brian MacQuarrie, Black-Latino Alliance Buoys L.A. Mayor Candidate, THE

BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 2005, at Al.
133 Davison M. Douglas, Justifying Racial Reform, 16 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1998)
(reviewing DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, COJ\i"TEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE !:MAGE
OF THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996 (1997)) (citations omitted).

2006]

A Matter of Rhetoric

225

program in terms of debt, and perpetuating a damaged image of
minority populations. That said, these rationales are philosophically and formally much more satisfying justifications for affirmative action. Where the Supreme Court is called upon to protect minority interests, however, their role will necessarily be
more political than formally legal. By embracing a rhetoric that
seeks to persuade the political majority, Justice O'Connor best
serves the interests of racial minorities. Justice O'Connor's
adoption of diversity, and even her decision to reject the undergraduate program's numerical emphasis in Gratz, were designed
to appeal to this constituency. A Court that insisted on legal
formalism without a thought to politics would fail in its role to
defend and further minority political gains.
IV. HOW GRUTTER'S APPLICATION OF THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE
DEFENDS MINORITY INTERESTS

With the importance of the public audience in mind, we now
turn to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter. Much has been
made of O'Connor's tendency to look at adjudication from a legislator's perspective. In practice, this point of view has led
O'Connor to fashion an ad hoc, pragmatic jurisprudence. This
pragmatism, and her notorious penchant for balancing tests, 134 is
frequently a source of scorn within the academy. I will leave for
another day a discussion of whether or not such criticisms are
warranted. For our purposes, however, this explicitly political
point of view is the ideal perspective to bring to writing an opinion that vindicates affirmative action.
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's political radar is so finely tuned
that she can detect the needs, insecurities and values of the "pubFurthermore,
lic," and fashion her opinion accordingly.135
O'Connor undoubtedly knows that it is not really the "public"
that shapes its own constitutional discourse (if constitutional
scholars barely read any Supreme Court decisions, it is hardly
possible that the citizenry does). Public discussion is framed, instead, by journalists and other members of the media elite. The
Grutter decision is perfectly pitched to this constituency; it appears, like the best of plays, to be self-consciously designed to
evoke particular responses in a particular audience. Once we
understand that this is O'Connor's intent in Grutter, we can ap-

134 Richard Brust, Balancing Act: Her Constitutional Tests and Strategic Concurrences Helped Make Sandra Day O'Connor a Force from the Center, ABA JOURNAL, Sept.
2005, at 34, available at http://www.abanet.org/journallredesign/09fscase.html.
135 For purposes of this analysis I will operate under the fiction that we can actually
determine O'Connor's intentions from the text and the context in which they were made.
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preciate how skillfully she works to manipulate the public discourse.
A

From Decision to Narrative

The Law and Literature movement has sought to wring insight from the observation that lawyers are like novelists because
both construct reality by telling stories through language.
Though the movement has not sought to compare lawyers and
reporters, journalists are also storytellers, spinning verifiable
facts into yarns that appeal to their particular readerships.
Moreover, unlike novelists, journalists have more than a passing
relationship with the law; reporters translate the law into stories
that their readership can digest.
This more general audience means that when journalists interpret Supreme Court decisions, they ask different questions
than lawyers do. Journalists do not wonder: "Is the decision logically consistent? How will it be received by the lower courts?
Does it violate accepted constitutional theory?" Instead, journalists ask what stories the decision tells. Their editors ask, "What
is my headline? How do I get the attention of my distractible
readership?" With this knowledge of how legal decisions of public
importance are consumed, O'Connor has deliberately crafted
Grutter in a way that tells some stories and buries others. The
stories she chooses to tell serve to empower minorities and assuage the egos of the majority. But as with any writer, the stories that O'Connor chooses not to tell are as important as the
ones she does. To put it more esoterically, Grutter displays a
mastery of what Sunstein dubs the constructive use of silence.l36
What is most ingenious about Justice O'Connor's Grutter
opinion is the way in which it uses the definitional capaciousness
of the diversity rationale, or, if you prefer, the instability of its
meaning, to facilitate her narrative project. Diversity allows
O'Connor to take all the best arguments for affirmative action,
each one logically distinct, and place each under the "diversity"
heading. This everything-but-the-kitchen sink approach works
because, ultimately, affirmative action's justification comes from
a variety of analyses and rationales. When considered individually, the "pros" of any one rationale barely outweigh the "cons."
The sum, however, of these diverse rationales makes an effective
case for the program.
This kind of summation is unwieldy, though. If fully articulated in a legal opinion it would distract substantially from the

136

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 39.
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opinion's central holding. With diversity as Grutter's primary organizing principle, however, O'Connor was able to argue, without
apparent inconsistency, that diversity has positive educational
value, allows the American military to defend our interests, provides the citizenry with a representative cross-section of leaders
in disparate fields, aids in the formation of good citizens, and
that diversity is necessary "[b]y virtue of our Nation's struggle
with racial inequality."l37
B.

Diversity as Anti-Story

Ironically, by adopting diversity, the subject of so much
hand-wringing in the academy, Justice O'Connor avoided making
Grutter's rationale the primary subject of public discussion about
the decision. Why? Because diversity is old news, so to speak.
O'Connor's reaffirmation of a prevailing rationale did not make
for an interesting story.
In advance of the decision, there was speculation (hope in
some corners) that the Court would use Grutter to change course
and ground affirmative action in a new rationale. These alternative rationales, had the Court adopted them, would have made
for excellent news. Imagine the headlines had Grutter endorsed
affirmative action as a remedy for continuing societal discrimination: "Racists Every One: The High Court Calls Affirmative Action a Necessity in Racist Nation"; "New Analysis: Are We Racists Without Even Knowing it?"; "Affirmative Action: the Price
We Pay for Continued Racism." Historical remediation would
also fare poorly: "Past Sins Still Cost, High Court Says"; "Blacks
to Whites: Pay Up with Affirmative Action (It's Better than
Reparations)." Needless to say, discussions framed in this way
would not further minority interests.
C.

Narrative 1: Whites Benefit from Affirmative Action and
They Can Become Diverse, Too

In its substantive ruling (affirming the use of race-based
preferences), Grutter unavoidably reinforces the Republican narrative of white victimization. The structure of affirmative action
requires that some group pay the cost, and those who pay may
easily consider themselves victimized. O'Connor's opinion, however, is designed to minimize this narrative by omitting an explicit elaboration of this story and by emphasizing a distracting
counter-narrative that illustrates the many ways in which diversity encompasses experiences and histories that the majority
possesses.
137

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003).
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Like all impact litigation plaintiffs, Barbara Grutter was
chosen to be the face of the crusade because she has characteristics that make her a sympathetic victim. First, Ms. Grutter is a
woman. A female plaintiff is appealing both because prevailing
societal stereotypes view females as commonly victimized and because women were once affirmative action's primary beneficiaries, and in some work contexts still are.
Second, Grutter did well in college, she graduated with a
relatively high GPA, but did less well on the LSAT.l38 Today her
GPA would place her in the top 25% of Michigan's law school's
admittees, while her LSAT score would place her in the bottom
25%.139 These numbers suggest that Grutter had a plausible
chance of being admitted to the University of Michigan Law
School, but they also contain a subtle subtext. Her high grades
signal diligence and effort, while her low LSAT score grants her a
humanizing failing.
Finally, Grutter does not fit the profile of the typical University of Michigan student. She is a mother and businesswoman,
and when she applied in 1997 she was forty-three years old.140
These characteristics are the most troublesome for the diversity
rationale. In an interview conducted before the Court granted
certiorari, Grutter herself described her denial of admission in a
way that creates a rhetorical rift between race and diversity: "It
was not a diversity issue, it was a race issue," she said.l41
Aware of these concerns, O'Connor minimizes Barbara Grutter's sympathetic characteristics by effacing her from the opinion
as much as possible. Of course, O'Connor could not leave Grutter
out of the opinion entirely because judicial conventions require a
factual recitation and summary of the procedural posture, and in
this case, the plaintiffs personal characteristics were plainly important to the ultimate disposition. Even so, O'Connor uses the
convention to radically dehumanize Grutter. Where news stories
preceding the resolution of the case emphasized Grutter's unique
personal characteristics, O'Connor's description of the plaintiff
renders her characterless. In Justice O'Connor's narrative, Barbara Grutter, mother and businesswoman, becomes "a white
Michigan resident who applied to the Law School in 1996 with a
Id. at 316.
See LSAC, Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, Profile of the University
of Michigan Law School, http://officialguide.lsac.org/OFFGUIDE/pdf/aba1839.pdf.
140 Anne Gearan, Rejected "White Law School Applicant Appeals Reverse Discrimination Case to Supreme Court, The AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY PROJECT, Aug. 9,
2002, http://aad.english. ucsb.edu/docs/gearan.html; see Bill Mears, Supreme Court Hears
Affirmative Action Arguments, CNN.COM, Apr. 1, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/
03/31/scotus.affirmative.action.advance/.
141 Gearan, supra note 140.
138
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3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score."I42 Mter this cursory description
Grutter is further reduced. Her name never again appears in the
opinion; she is afterward referred to only as "petitioner."
This kind of radical reduction, of course, is a staple of legal
reasoning. Legal opinions always seek to minimize damaging
facts and emphasize favorable ones. O'Connor's description of
Grutter is only notable because the rest of her opinion goes to
such pains to validate the importance of humanizing applicants
by thorough non-empirical consideration. Plainly, O'Connor was
concerned that Grutter might become the story; she would surely
be interviewed after the Court rendered its decision, just as she
was before oral argument. There was no need, then, for the
Court to further emphasize Grutter's narrative, especially when
it would conflict so obviously with the story that O'Connor was
trying to tell.
That story, of diversity's inclusiveness, occupies a primary
place in the opinion, directly preceding the declaration of a
twenty-five year "time limit" on the program, O'Connor's other
strategic concession to the sentiments of whites.I43 By emphasizing the preference that the law school confers on students who
have traveled widely, who speak foreign languages, who have
overcome personal adversity or family hardships, or who have
pursued careers in other fields,I44 O'Connor shows how diversity
includes experiences and accomplishments that happen to, or can
be achieved by, all Americans. Further, by analogizing race to
other experiences that whites commonly find "enriching," the
benefits of minority perspectives in the academy is made less abstract to those who do not see life through a racial lens. In
O'Connor's narrative, then, racial knowledge becomes a subcategory of universal, attainable life experience, rather than a
separate, exclusive, and unattainable characteristic.I45
This expansive definition of merit is implicitly contrasted
with the much less desirable alternative of an admissions regime
that considered only an applicant's LSAT score and GPA, or, like
the undergraduate program, one that converted "soft" characteristics into numerical values. In either of the latter two scenarios,
applicants are just numbers. Few Americans of any color would
prefer to go before an admissions committee as a numerical
summation rather than as "whole" person.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
See infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
144 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338.
145 This frame is in marked contrast to nearlv all anti-discrimination laws which emphasize the immutability of race as a basis f~r gr;nting judicial and legislative protection.
142

143
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These effects are subtle, and their main purpose is simply to
create a storyline that deflects attention from narratives that
might emphasize affirmative action's inherent contradictions.
Should the journalist or lay reader fail to appreciate these subtleties, however, O'Connor made sure to cap her ruling with a guaranteed headline generator, a few paragraphs of dicta that were
transubstantiated by reporters into a twenty-five year time
limit.I46
Narrative 2: Affirmative Action Will End

D.

Time limits are dangerous terrain for the judiciary; indeed,
courts have a general aversion to numbers in any context. But
Americans like time limits because they provide a sense of closure by marking a point where things will change. O'Connor is
careful to structure her affirmative action "time limit'' so as to
generate headlines, while making it apparent to a legal audience
that the limit is not formally binding.
She pulls off this sleight of hand by devoting a few paragraphs to a discussion of case law that articulates why "raceconscious admissions policies must be limited in time,"I47 creating the impression that she will follow this precedent and declare
a time limit for affirmative action in higher education. In a nod
to her public audience, O'Connor emphasizes that time limits are
important because they "assureD all citizens that the deviation
from the norm of equal treatment ... is a temporary matter."I48
Mter all this bluster, though, she promulgates a rather
toothless limit, stating only that "[w]e [the majority] expect that
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today."l49 Plainly, this
tepid language will not cause Grutter to self-destruct twenty-five
years from now,l50 though it will force a future court to be less
deferential to universities still granting racial preferences after
the lapse of the "limit." Even so, there is nothing in the decision
that precludes the Court from granting an extension for the practice if hoped-for gains fail to materialize. To most journalists,
however, these legal distinctions will be lost in the race to create
attention-grabbing headlines.l51
146

See, e.g., Daniel Mark Fogel, Expiration Date Is Set, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2003, § 2,

at 1.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, at 510 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
149 Id. at 343.
150 Surprisingly, Justice Thomas appears to believe that the twenty-five year "time
limit" represents an actual holding. Id. at 375-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151 E.g., Fogel, supra note 146.
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In keeping with the rest of O'Connor's opinion, the time limit
also serves to empower minorities by suggesting a point at which
preferences will be unnecessary, willing by judicial fiat a movement towards equal treatment. Though the deadline is nonbinding, O'Connor has created a public expectation that affirmative action, in this context, will end. This expectation means that
it will be politically difficult to grant such an extension, even
though it is formally possible. The time limit's substantive effect,
then, is to make minority underperformance much more pressing, while allowing for an extension of affirmative action in the
case that improvements in poorer school districts fail to materialIze.
Plainly, this opinion will not catalyze wholesale change in
the status of inner-city public schools, but universities are powerful institutions that may now take more aggressive steps to improve the educational pipeline that brings students to their campuses.
In this way, O'Connor has constructed a narrative for consumption by a public audience that seeks to assuage negative
sentiment among whites while changing the role of minorities
from beneficiaries to patrons. In this tale, it is all students, especially whites, who benefit from the educational enhancements of
affirmative action.
E.

Narrative 3: Minorities Undamaged

There are reasons for underrepresented minorities to like
Justice O'Connor's opinion, other than for its central holding.
Most prominently, the diversity rationale "un-damages" minorities by converting race from a stigma into a category of knowledge. O'Connor also manages to elegantly collapse the distinction that the dissenters seek to enact between diversity and
merit:
With respect to the use of race itself, all underrepresented minority
students admitted by the Law School have been deemed qualified. By
virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality, such students
are both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the
Law School's mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful
numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.152

What is so brilliant about this particular passage is the
economy with which it accomplishes three discrete tasks. It
manages to place underrepresented minorities on the same level
as their white counterparts, stating that all minority students
have ''been deemed qualified." Then, in the next breath, it subtly
152

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-38.
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acknowledges how past and present racial discrimination both
account for underrepresented minorities' racial knowledge and
mandate the need for preference. Thus, effectively, O'Connor incorporates the favored rationales of liberal elites-past and present discrimination-into her opinion, but by wrapping them in
diversity's comfortable, non-accusatory embrace, she dampens
the sting that they would carry in their full elaboration.
Better still for the status interests of underrepresented minorities, Grutter focused attention on the crucial role that these
groups play in the American armed services.I53 O'Connor was
only able to highlight the contents of an amicus brief submitted
by retired military officers because of the flexibility of her
kitchen-sink diversity approach. Under a more traditional structure, this argument could not be accommodated because it is inconsistent with an emphasis on past or present discrimination.
These former officers believe that having an officer corps that
mirrors the composition of enlisted men and women is imperative
for our national security, or, as one commentator put it, a racially
integrated officer corps may be "mission critical."r54
This is another line of argument that does double duty. It
recasts underrepresented minorities in the role of patriots and
thereby raises the stakes of the affirmative action debate. By
linking affirmative action to national security at a time when
anxiety over security was high, O'Connor knit together the interests of all Americans. Again, by reading Grutter as a text aimed
at a public audience, we can appreciate how O'Connor is crafting
a narrative that affirms and validates the status of underrepresented minorities, while methodically convincing whites that affirmative action is in their interest and even in the best interests
of the country.
To her credit, O'Connor's political instincts were spot on.
The adoption of the arguments put forth in the military brief
garnered significant press coverage, with many media outlets
speculating that that brief swung the Court's discussionJ55
F.

Narrative 4: Universities Deserve Special Deference

The other prominent story that Grutter tells is one that elevates the civic role of universities in order to justify the exceptional legal deference that O'Connor grants them in her opin-

Id. at 331.
See Bryan W. Leach, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale
in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1094 (2004).
155 See LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 56-58.
153
154
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ion.156 This deference was particularly important for O'Connor to
articulate because she wanted to avoid undertaking a detailed
statistical inquiry in the text of her opinion. Such an inquiry
would have told a story she did not want to tell.
Many critics believe that this deference, as well as
O'Connor's refusal to address the "racial balancing'' accusations
lobbed in the dissent, eviscerate the meaning of strict scrutiny.l57
This group argues that O'Connor simply failed to apply the standard that she said that she was applying. In reality, O'Connor
applied the standard, but did not make her analysis public, because the story of that strict-scrutiny application is not something that furthers the substantive interests of minorities.
After all, protecting that interest was her main concern. The
strict-scrutiny test was designed to "smoke out" policies that hurt
minorities;l58 there is no reason, then, that O'Connor should be
forced into a public discussion of that inquiry if that discussion
would actually hurt her main constituency in the political realm.
Diversity, then, is more than just a "fig leaf' for affirmative
action. The rationale represents a self-conscious judicial choice
to present affirmative action in a way that will advance and protect minority rights in a political system that systematically denies underrepresented minorities the ability to lobby for more
substantive change.
CONCLUSION: THE REAL PROBLEM WITH THE DIVERSITY
RATIONALE AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

For those who aspire to the truest form of racial equality, one
that would overthrow the master narrative of white dominance,
my defense of affirmative action will ring hollow. In essence, I
am advocating the adoption of the diversity rationale as a way to
appease a white constituency that, from a neutral standpoint,
has no right to be appeased. The ultimate story of affirmative action, then, is the story of every liberal reform of a fundamentally
unequal system. Derrick Bell told this story nearly twenty-five
years ago:
First, blacks are more likely to obtain relief for even acknowledged ra·
cial injustice when that relief also serves, directly or indirectly, to fur·
ther ends which policymakers perceive are in the best interests of the
country. Second, blacks as well as their white allies, are likely to focus with gratitude on the relief obtained, usually after a long struggle.

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. L.
REV. 459, 468 (2004).
158 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
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Little attention is paid to the self-interest factors without which no relief might have been gained. Moreover, the relief is viewed as proof
that society is indeed just, and that eventually all racial injustices will
be recognized and remedied. Third, the remedy for blacks appropriately viewed as a "good deal" by policymaking whites often provide
[sic] benefits for blacks that are more symbolic than substantive; but
whether substantive or not, they are often perceived by working class
whites as both an unearned gift to blacks and a betrayal of poor
whites.159

For all the work that Justice O'Connor does to mitigate some
of the most troubling aspects of this narrative, no judicial opinion
can magically refigure a story that has its roots deep in our country's troubled history. I doubt that this nation's original sinsthe robbing of virgin territory, the enslavement of a race of people, the subjugation of people who lost battle after battle----<:an
ever truly be overcome; these acts will continue to haunt our nation.
Still, troubling ghosts can catalyze change, and though
America remains far from equal, affirmative action in higher
education is making things incrementally, but significantly, better. By ensuring that underrepresented minorities are a significant presence on college and university campuses, we are not
stigmatizing an entire generation, as some critics would have us
believe. Doubts as to the abilities of minorities would persist
with or without affirmative action; that is the nature of prejudice. But this prejudice would persist unabated if there were
fewer underrepresented minorities passing through the manicured quadrangles of elite colleges and universities. Mahzarin
Banaji, the Harvard professor who has shown how unconsciously
racist human beings are, has suggested that the only way to
overcome these biases is to develop close personal and professional relationships with members of those groups that one harbors bias against.160 That analysis is the best evidence yet that
affirmative action, for all the controversy it causes, may be working to heal this nation and stifle the hauntings of those terrible
ghosts.

159 BELL, supra note 57, at 7.
160 See Kang, supra note 116, at 1593.

